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Chemical Corp., also known as Maxus Energy
517 F.3d 104
United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
VIETNAM ASSOCIATION FOR VICTIMS OF
AGENT ORANGE, Phan Thi Phi Phi, Nguyen
Van Quy, Individually and as parent and natural
guardian of Nguyen Quang Trung, Thuy Nguyen Thi
Nga, His children, Duong Quynh Hoa, Individually
and as administratrix of the estate of her deceased
child, Huynh Trung Son, On behalf of themselves
and others similarly situated, Nguyen Thang
Loi, Tong Thi Tu, Nguyen Long Van, Nguyen Thi
Thoi, Nguyen Minh Chau, Nguyen Thi Nham, Le
Thi Vinh, Nguyen Thi Hoa, Individually and as
parent and natural guardian of Vo Thanh Tuan
Anh, her child, Vo Thanh Hai, Nguyen Thi Thu,
Individually and as parent and natural guardian
of Nguyen Son Linh and Nguyen Son Tra, Her
children, Dang Thi Hong Nhut, Nguyen Dinh Thanh,
Nguyen Muoi, Ho Thi Le, Individually and as
administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband
Ho Xuan Bat, Ho Kan Hai, Individually and as
parent and natural guardian of Nguyen Van Hoang,
her child, and Vu Thi Loan, Plaintiffs–Appellants,
v.
DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, Monsanto Company,
Monsanto Chemical Co., Hercules, Inc., Occidental
Chemical Corporation, Thompson Hayward
Chemical Co., Harcros Chemicals, Inc., Uniroyal
Chemical Co, Inc., Uniroyal, Inc., Uniroyal Chemical
Holding Company, Uniroyal Chemical Acquisition
Corporation, C.D.U. Holding, Inc., Diamond
Shamrock Agricultural Chemicals, Inc., Diamond
Shamrock Chemical Company, also known as
Diamond Shamrock Refining & Marketing Co.,
also known as Occidental Electro Chemical Corp.,
also known as Maxus Energy Corp., also known
as Occidental Chemical Corp., also known as
Diamond Shamrock, Diamond Shamrock Chemical,
also known as Diamond Shamrock Refining &
Marketing Co., also known as Occidental Electro

Corp., also known as Occidental Chemical Corp.,
also known as Diamond Shamrock, Diamond
Shamrock Refining and Marketing Company,
Occidental Electrochemicals Corporation, Hooker
Chemical Corporation, Hooker Chemical Far East
Corporation, Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp.,
Chemical Land Holdings, Inc., T–H Agriculture &
Nutrition Co., Thompson Chemical Corporation,
also known as Thompson Chemical Corp., Riverdale
Chemical Company, Defendants–Appellees,
Pharmacia Corp., formerly known as Monsanto
Co., Ultramar Diamond Shamrock Corporation,
Maxus Energy Corp., Diamond Alkali Company,
Ansul Incorporated, American Home Products
Corporation, formerly known as American
Home Products, Wyeth, Inc., Hoffman–
Taff Chemicals, Inc., Elementis Chemicals,
Inc., United States Rubber Company, Inc.,
Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., ABC Chemical
Companies 1–50, Syntex Laboratories, Inc., Valero
Energy Corporation, doing business as Valero
Marketing And Supply Company, Defendants.
Docket No. 05–1953–cv. | Argued:
June 18, 2007. | Decided: Feb. 22, 2008.
Synopsis
Background: Vietnamese nonprofit group and individual
Vietnamese nationals brought product liability action against
chemical companies under international and United States
law, alleging personal injury and property damage caused by
herbicides manufactured by companies and sold to United
States for use during Vietnam War. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Jack B.
Weinstein, Senior District Judge, 373 F.Supp.2d 7, dismissed
action. Plaintiffs appealed.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Miner, Circuit Judge, held
that: (1)District Court lacked jurisdiction under Alien Tort
Statute (ATS) to consider plaintiffs' claims; (2) government
contractor defense barred state law claims; and (3) District
Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant
extraterritorial injunctive relief.
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sues, (2) for a tort, (3) committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty ratified by the
United States. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350.

Affirmed.

10 Cases that cite this headnote
West Headnotes (9)
[3]
[1]

Federal Courts
Injunction

221 International Law
221k1 Nature and authority in general

Federal Courts
Depositions and discovery
170B Federal Courts
170BXVII Courts of Appeals
170BXVII(K) Scope and Extent of Review
170BXVII(K)2 Standard of Review
170Bk3612 Remedial Matters
170Bk3616 Injunction
170Bk3616(1) In general
(Formerly 170Bk814.1)
170B Federal Courts
170BXVII Courts of Appeals
170BXVII(K) Scope and Extent of Review
170BXVII(K)2 Standard of Review
170Bk3576 Procedural Matters
170Bk3591 Depositions and discovery
(Formerly 170Bk820)

International Law
Nature and authority in general

The “law of nations” is synonymous with
the term “customary international law,” which
describes the body of rules that nations in the
international community universally abide by, or
accede to, out of a sense of legal obligation and
mutual concern.
7 Cases that cite this headnote
[4]

International Law
Nature and authority in general
221 International Law
221k1 Nature and authority in general

While not exhaustive, the list of principles that
may be said to have ripened into universally
accepted norms of international law, includes
the proscriptions against piracy, slave trade,
attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, and
war crimes. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States § 404.

The Court of Appeals reviews denials of leave
to conduct discovery and of injunctive relief for
abuse of discretion, which may consist of a ruling
based upon an erroneous view of the law or a
clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.

3 Cases that cite this headnote
13 Cases that cite this headnote
[5]
[2]

Federal Courts
Tort claims
170B Federal Courts
170BIV Cases “Arising Under” Federal Law;
Federal-Question Jurisdiction
170BIV(B) Particular Cases, Contexts, and
Questions
170Bk2295 Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship
170Bk2297 Tort claims
(Formerly 170Bk192.10)

The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) confers
federal subject matter jurisdiction when three
independent conditions are satisfied: (1) an alien

Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship
Violation of law of nations
24 Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship
24IX Alien Tort Claims
24k761 Torts Covered
24k763 Violation of law of nations

Whether an alleged norm of international law
can form the basis of an Alien Tort Statute
(ATS) claim will depend upon whether it is: (1)
defined with a specificity comparable to these
familiar paradigms, and (2) based upon a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized
world. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350.
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of events giving rise to injuries alleged. 28
U.S.C.A. § 1350.

6 Cases that cite this headnote
[6]

79 Cases that cite this headnote

Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship
Violation of treaty of United States
Treaties
Negotiation and ratification

[8]

Products Liability
Pesticides, herbicides, insecticides,
fungicides, and rodenticides

24 Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship
24IX Alien Tort Claims
24k761 Torts Covered
24k764 Violation of treaty of United States
385 Treaties
385k3 Negotiation and ratification

313A Products Liability
313AII Elements and Concepts
313Ak177 Government contractors
(Formerly 313Ak43.5)
313A Products Liability
313AIII Particular Products
313Ak222 Pesticides, herbicides, insecticides,
fungicides, and rodenticides
(Formerly 313Ak43.5)

Geneva Protocol of 1925 was not a “treaty
of the United States,” for purposes of Alien
Tort Statute's (ATS) grant to district courts of
jurisdiction over civil action by alien for tort
committed in violation of treaty of the United
States, with respect to period when United States
used herbicides during Vietnam War, inasmuch
as United States did not ratify Protocol until
1975, and even then reserved right to respond
in kind to belligerent's first use of poisonous
weapons and further limited treaty obligation
to apply only against other treaty parties. 28
U.S.C.A. § 1350.
2 Cases that cite this headnote
[7]

Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship
Violation of law of nations
24 Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship
24IX Alien Tort Claims
24k761 Torts Covered
24k763 Violation of law of nations

District court lacked jurisdiction under Alien
Tort Statute (ATS) to consider claims
by Vietnamese nationals that chemical
companies violated customary international law
norms prohibiting use of poisoned weapons
and infliction of unnecessary suffering by
manufacturing herbicides and supplying them
to United States for use during Vietnam war,
inasmuch as such claims were not grounded
in norm that was universally accepted at time

Products Liability
Government contractors

Government
contractor
defense
barred
Vietnamese nationals' state law tort claims
against chemical companies arising from their
manufacture of herbicides supplied to United
States for use during Vietnam war.
1 Cases that cite this headnote
[9]

International Law
Extraterritorial rights and jurisdiction
221 International Law
221k7 Extraterritorial rights and jurisdiction

District court did not abuse its discretion
in refusing to grant Vietnamese nationals
extraterritorial injunctive relief in form
of environmental abatement, clean-up, and
disgorgement of profits, in nationals' action
under international law and domestic tort
law arising from companies' manufacture of
herbicides used by United States during Vietnam
war, given concerns over Vietnam's sovereignty
and district court's lack of jurisdiction over
relevant territory.
2 Cases that cite this headnote
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Attorneys and Law Firms
*106 Jonathan C. Moore, Moore & Goodman LLP, New
York, N.Y. (William H. Goodman and David Milton, Moore
& Goodman LLP, New York, NY, Constantine P. Kokkoris,
Esq., New York, NY, Frank Davis and Johnny Norris, Davis
& Norris LLP, *107 Birmingham, AL, Robert Roden,
Shelby Roden LLC, Birmingham, AL, Jonathan Cartee and
R. Stan Morris, Cartee & Morris LLC, Birmingham, AL, and
Kathleen Melez, Esq., Los Angeles, CA, on the brief), for
Plaintiffs–Appellants.
Seth P. Waxman, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP,
Washington, DC (Paul R.Q. Wolfson and Leondra R. Kruger,
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, Washington, DC,
Joseph R. Guerra and Maria T. DiGiulian, Sidley Austin LLP,
Washington, DC, Richard P. Bress and Matthew K. Roskoski,
Latham & Watkins LLP, Washington, DC, James E. Tyrrell
Jr., Latham & Watkins, Newark, NJ, and John C. Sabetta and
Andrew T. Hahn, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, New York, NY, on the
brief), for Defendants–Appellees Monsanto Co., Monsanto
Chemical Co., and Pharmacia Corp.
Andrew L. Frey, Charles A. Rothfeld, and Lauren R.
Goldman, Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw LLP, New York,
NY, James L. Stengel, Laurie Strauch Weiss, and Adam
Zimmerman, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, New
York, NY, and Steve Brock and James V. Aiosa, Rivkin
Radler LLP, Uniondale, NY, for Defendant–Appellant Dow
Chemical Co.
William A. Krohley and William C. Heck, Kelley Drye
& Warren LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant–Appellee
Hercules, Inc.
Michael M. Gordon, McKee Nelson, New York, NY,
for Defendants–Appellants Occidental Chemical Corp., as
successor to Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co.; Maxus
Energy Corp.; Tierra Solutions, Inc., f/k/a Chemical Land
Holdings, Inc.; and Valero Energy Corp., as successor to
Ultramar Diamond Shamrock Corp. Lawrence D'Aloise,
Clark, Gagliardi & Miller, White Plains, NY, for Defendants–
Appellants Harcros Chemicals, Inc., T–H Agriculture &
Nutrition Co., Thompson Chemical Corp., and Thompson
Hayward Chemical Co.
Myron Kalish, New York, NY, for Defendants–Appellees
C.D.U. Holding, Inc., Uniroyal Chemical Acquisition,

Uniroyal Chemical Co., Inc., Uniroyal Chemical Holding
Co., and Uniroyal, Inc.
Anne E. Cohen and Anthea E. Roberts, Debevoise &
Plimpton LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants–Appellees
Hooker Chemical Entities.
Steven H. Hoeft, McDermott Will & Emery LLP, Chicago,
IL, and Chryssa V. Valletta, McDermott Will & Emery
LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant–Appellant Riverdale
Chemical Co.
Jeffrey Sedgwick, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Benton
J. Campbell, United States Attorney for the Eastern District
of New York, Brooklyn, NY, Mark B. Stern, Sharon Swingle,
Attorneys, Appellate Staff Civil Division, U.S. Department of
Justice, John B. Bellinger III, Legal Advisor, Department of
State, Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel,
Department of Defense, for Amicus Curiae the United States
of America.
Paul R. Friedman, John Townsend Rich, William F. Sheehan,
Goodwin Procter LLP, Washington, DC, Robin S. Conrad,
Amar D. Sarwal, National Chamber Litigation Center,
Inc., Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America.
Daniel J. Popeo, Paul D. Kamenar, David Price, Washington
Legal Foundation, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae
Washington Legal Foundation.
Before: MINER, SACK, and HALL, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
MINER, Circuit Judge:
This appeal challenges the District Court's dismissal
of an action brought by a *108 purported class of
Vietnamese nationals (“Plaintiffs”) on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated for injuries allegedly
sustained by their exposure to Agent Orange and other
herbicides manufactured by defendants-appellees United
States companies (collectively, “Defendants”) and deployed
by the United States military during the Vietnam War.
Plaintiffs brought this action seeking relief under the Alien
Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, which grants the district
courts jurisdiction over any civil action by an alien claiming
damages for a tort committed in violation of international
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law or a treaty of the United States. In their Complaint,
Plaintiffs alleged that the United States government violated
international law by spraying toxic herbicides in areas of
South Vietnam from 1962 to 1970 and that Defendants either
aided and abetted the government's violations by supplying
it with Agent Orange or that they were directly liable in
their corporate capacities. Plaintiffs also asserted claims
grounded in domestic tort law. In connection with their
alleged injuries, Plaintiffs sought money damages as well
as injunctive relief in the form of environmental abatement,
clean-up, and disgorgement of profits.
Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In their motion,
Defendants contended that the Complaint failed to state a
claim under the Alien Tort Statute because it did not allege
a violation of any well-defined and universally-accepted rule
of international law as required by Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 159 L.Ed.2d 718 (2004).
Defendants also argued that Plaintiffs lacked standing to
bring suit, that their claims under the Alien Tort Statute were
nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine, and that
all of their claims were barred by the government-contractor
defense. In addition, Defendants moved for partial summary
judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56
to dismiss all claims as barred by the applicable statute
of limitations. In the course of the proceedings below, the
United States government submitted a Statement of Interest
supporting Defendants' position with respect to the issues of
international law and on the questions of justiciability and the
government-contractor defense.
The District Court made several rulings that were favorable
to Plaintiffs, but it ultimately determined that Plaintiffs had
failed to allege a violation of international law because
Agent Orange was used to protect United States troops
against ambush and not as a weapon of war against
human populations. The District Court also determined that
Plaintiffs' domestic tort law claims were barred by the
government-contractor defense, which the court previously
had found to bar similar claims brought by United States
veterans against some of the same defendants named
as defendants-appellees in the companion appeal decided
herewith. Accordingly, the court denied Plaintiffs' claims for
relief under both international and domestic law and granted
Defendants' motion dismissing the Complaint. Because we

agree with the conclusions reached by the District Court in
this case, we affirm the judgment for the reasons set forth in
this Opinion.

BACKGROUND
I. United States Authorization of Herbicide Use in
Vietnam
Early in the Vietnam conflict, the United States government
began exploring the possibility of using herbicides to deprive
enemy forces infiltrating South Vietnam of the benefit of
vegetation that provided them with cover and sustenance.
In late *109 1961, the United States Department of State
and the Department of Defense recommended to President
Kennedy that the military initiate a defoliation program.
President Kennedy soon accepted that recommendation and,
in November 1961, approved the launch of military herbicide
operations in Vietnam. Operation Trail Dust, as the entire
herbicide operation was called, included the United States
Air Force Program known as Operation Ranch Hand, which
commenced its defoliation spray missions in September
1962; missions targeting crops that sustained enemy forces
commenced in November of that same year.
Herbicides were effective in meeting important United States
and allied military objectives in Vietnam. As Assistant
Secretary of Defense William Lemos explained: “[O]ne of
the most difficult problems of military operations in South
Vietnam is the inability to observe the enemy in the dense
forest and jungle.” After summarizing the military's herbicide
operations, Admiral Lemos then concluded: “The result is
that our forces have been better able to accomplish their
mission with significantly reduced U.S. and Vietnamese
casualties.” Another Assistant Secretary later explained that
the “use of ... herbicides [in Vietnam] was appropriate and
had one purpose—to [s]ave the lives of Americans and our
allies.” The record in this case reveals that the policy of
the Department of Defense at that time was to “carefully
select [ ]” crop destruction targets “so as to attack only
those crops known to be grown by or from the [Viet Cong]
or [North Vietnamese Army],” and the Department “ha[d]
issued instructions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reemphasize
the already existing policy that [chemical herbicides] be
utilized only in areas remote from population.” Admiral
Lemos also stressed that the military had instituted policies
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intended to ensure that the herbicides were applied only to
targets of military significance.
The herbicide program nevertheless was controversial, as
decision-makers recognized it would be from the outset.
But despite concerns that Communist propaganda would
characterize the program as a form of germ or chemical
warfare, policymakers persisted in the decision to use
herbicides in light of their substantial military benefits.
They also consistently concluded that the military's use
of herbicides in Vietnam was permissible under existing
treaties and customary international law. Secretary of State
Dean Rusk advised President Kennedy in 1961 that “the
use of defoliant does not violate any rule of international
law concerning the conduct of chemical warfare and is an
accepted tactic of war.” In 1969, the United States faced a
move in the United Nations General Assembly to resolve
whether the 1925 Geneva Protocol, see Geneva Protocol for
the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating Poisonous
or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,
June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 (entered into
force Feb. 8, 1928, for the United States, Apr. 10, 1975)
(the “1925 Geneva Protocol”), banned at least some herbicide
use in warfare. The United States delegation rejected that
interpretation, claiming that “[c]hemical herbicides ... which
were unknown in 1925, could not be included” within
the scope of the prohibitions. Thus, the United States
voted against the resolution. In 1970, when President
Nixon transmitted the 1925 Geneva Protocol to the Senate
for ratification, Secretary of State William Pierce Rogers
reiterated that “[i]t is the United States' understanding of
the Protocol that it does not prohibit the use in war of ...
chemical herbicides.” And in 1975, when President Ford
issued Executive Order 11,850 renouncing, “as a matter of
national policy, *110 first use of herbicides in war,” his
accompanying remarks confirmed the consistent position of
the United States that “the [1925 Geneva] protocol does not
cover ... chemical herbicides.”
Congress was well aware of the herbicide program, and while
it denied funds for certain military initiatives in Southeast
Asia of which it disapproved, it never denied funding for
herbicides. Instead, it affirmatively ratified herbicide use by
appropriating funds specifically for herbicide procurement,
and attempts by members of Congress to terminate or
constrain the herbicide program failed by wide margins.
See S.Rep. No. 91–1016, at 85–87 (1970). During the

Senate debate over the Military Procurement Authorization
Act of 1971, United States Senators Gaylord Nelson and
Charles Goodell introduced an amendment to prohibit the
expenditure of funds for any military application of antiplant chemicals or for the transfer of anti-plant chemicals for
use by other countries. The full Senate rejected this measure
by a vote of 62–22. Another amendment sought to prohibit
the expenditure of funds for the use of chemicals for crop
destruction, and that amendment was rejected by a vote of
48–33. Thus, while keenly aware of arguments against the
military use of herbicides in Vietnam, Congress continued to
appropriate the funds necessary to sustain the program. See
116 Cong. Rec. 30,036–30,227 (1970).
Congress likewise was aware of the controversy over
the legality of the use by the United States of
herbicides in Vietnam. Indeed, a congressional report
observed that, although it was highly desirable that
the United States adhere to the 1925 Geneva Protocol,
such adherence could be difficult to attain if it would
require acceptance of the view that the use of herbicides
would violate international law, a position the United
States had consistently rejected. See REPORT OF THE
SUBCOMM. ON NATIONAL SECURITY, 91ST CONG.,
CHEMICAL–BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: U.S. POLICIES
& INTERNATIONAL EFFECTT 5–6, 9 (Comm. Print
1970). Even after the United States terminated the use of
herbicides, the government continued to maintain that the
1925 Geneva Protocol did not prohibit the use of herbicides
in war. When President Nixon submitted the Protocol to the
Senate for its advice and consent, Secretary of State Rogers
explained to the Senate that the United States had decided
not to enter a reservation that would preserve its ability to
use herbicides, precisely because the United States' position
remained that the Protocol did not prohibit “the use in war
of ... chemical herbicides,” Letter of Submittal from Secretary
of State William P. Rogers to the President (Aug. 11, 1970).
See The Geneva Protocol of 1925: Hearings Before the Sen.
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong. 6–7 (1972).

II. Post–War Adjustments with Vietnam
The Paris Peace Accords of January 1973 ended the United
States' participation in the Vietnam War. After the fall of
Saigon in 1975, the United States severed relations with
Vietnam and imposed a trade embargo prohibiting most
commercial transactions between United States nationals and
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Vietnamese nationals. See 31 C.F.R. § 500.201. President
Clinton partially lifted the trade embargo in February 1994,
and he fully lifted it in March 1995. On January 28, 1995,
the United States and Vietnam agreed to a settlement of
certain outstanding claims between the countries. This 1995
Agreement covers all claims against either nation arising out
of “the nationalization, expropriation, or taking of, or other
measures directed against, properties, rights, and interests”
of the parties and their citizens during and after the war.
Significantly, the 1995 Agreement makes no provision for
reparations *111 or restitution to settle claims arising out of
the use by the United States of herbicides, including Agent
Orange.
The United States and Vietnam continue to discuss issues
arising out of the war in the context of their current
diplomatic, economic, trade, aid, and security relationships. 1
A 2002 Memorandum of Understanding provides for
scientists representing both governments to work together to
determine the effects, if any, of Agent Orange on people and
ecosystems, along with methods and costs of treatment and
environmental remediation. But, to date, the United States
never has agreed that it has a legal duty to provide funds
or assistance to remediate harms allegedly caused by Agent
Orange.
1

News of the Vietnamese President's visit to the United
States in June 2007 confirmed that the United States
and Vietnam currently are engaged in diplomatic efforts
regarding the Agent Orange issue:
In the build-up to the hearing, a Vietnamese
delegation is touring the United States screening
documentaries of disfigurement and other health
problems caused by dioxin, a small compound
within the ‘agent orange’ herbicide that is one of
the most toxic compounds known.... In the past
year, the two countries have set a new tone in
dealing with cleaning up toxins from former U.S. air
bases where they were stored in barrels marked with
an orange stripe. Government agencies and nongovernment organizations have plans to start cleanup in the central city of Danang this year. In late
May, [President] Bush signed a bill that provides
$3 million toward health and environment issues
stemming from dioxin.
Grant McCool, Vietnam Leader Visits U.S. for Trade,
Other Issues Weigh, Boston Globe, June 14, 2007.

III. Procurement of Agent Orange
The facts relevant to the manufacture and procurement of
Agent Orange are the principal focus of the appeals in the
veterans' cases (especially with regard to the governmentcontractor defense) and are set forth in this Court's opinion
resolving the veterans' claims before this Court. With respect
to the instant appeals by Vietnamese nationals, a brief
summary of the facts surrounding the veterans' appeals and
additional relevant facts underlying the Vietnamese nationals'
claims follows.
The herbicidal properties of the components of Agent Orange,
2,4–dicholoropheno–xyacetic acid (2,4–D) and 2,4,5–
tricholorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4,5–T), were identified in
research conducted by the United States military during the
1940s. In the 1950s, the military conducted field tests to
demonstrate the feasibility of dispensing those substances
from aircraft; these dissemination trials, and work on aerial
spray systems, laid the groundwork for the defoliation
systems used in Vietnam. In 1961, the Advanced Research
Projects Agency of the Department of Defense evaluated the
feasibility of defoliating tropical vegetation in Vietnam and
recommended that appropriate formulations of 2,4–D and
2,4,5–T be exploited for immediate use. In January 1962,
the United States Air Force began the operational phase of
the defoliation program in South Vietnam, using a substance
code-named Agent Purple. Later in 1962, a research team
concluded that a 50/50 mixture of 2,4–D and 2,4,5–T was
most effective—that formulation became known as Agent
Orange. See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 304
F.Supp.2d 404, 424–31 (E.D.N.Y.2004).
Formal specifications for 2,4–D and 2,4,5–T were prepared
and promulgated by the military. These specifications
established the design and specific characteristics of the
mixture of 2,4–D and 2,4,5–T that the government had
requested. The same specifications also were later used as
the basis for the military's procurement of *112 Agent
Orange. The government supplied manufacturers with copies
of these specifications and incorporated them into the
manufacturers' Agent Orange contracts. The government also
strictly prescribed the markings that were to be placed on
the drums of herbicides manufactured by the Defendants.
The names of the various “Agents” (Agent Orange, Agent
Purple, etc.) refer to the three-inch color-coded band that the
government required on the outside of the drums containing
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the relevant herbicide. Aside from that colored band, the
government generally prohibited the manufacturers from
including any language, markings, or identification on the
drums. Id.
In 1966, the government became concerned that the pace
of production of Agent Orange was insufficient to meet its
projected needs and decided instead to compel production
from the manufacturers. In so doing, the government acted
under the authority of the Defense Production Act of 1950
(“DPA”), 50 U.S.C.App. §§ 2061–2168 (1951 & Supp.1983).
Section 101 of the DPA authorized the President to “require
that performance under contracts or orders ... which he deems
necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense
shall take priority over performance under any other contract
or order, and, for the purpose of assuring such priority,
to require acceptance and performance of such contracts
or orders in preference to other contracts or orders.” Id. §
2071. The President thereafter delegated that authority to the
Secretary of Commerce. 18 Fed.Reg. 6503 (1953). In March
1967, the United States Department of Commerce, expressly
invoking Section 101 of the DPA, directed Defendants to
accelerate the delivery of existing orders for the defoliant
Agent Orange. This directive essentially commandeered all
of the Defendants' capacity to produce Agent Orange. In re
“Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 304 F.Supp.2d at 424–26.

IV. End of the Herbicide Program
In June 1966, a government study on the long-term health
effects of pesticides, including 2,4,5–T (known as the
Bionetics Study), uncovered evidence of teratogenicity (birth
defects) in mice. The completed Bionetics Study was
delivered to the National Cancer Institute (NCI), a component
of the National Institutes of Health, in September 1968,
although NCI personnel previously had received progress
reports concerning the possible teratogenicity of 2,4,5–T.
The government undertook further extensive analyses of
the Bionetics Study's data in early 1969, but it did not
restrict the ongoing herbicide program in Vietnam. However,
upon the public release of the Study in October 1969, the
government restricted the use of 2,4,5–T both in the United
States (on food crops and around the home) and in Vietnam,
limiting its use to areas remote from human populations.
On April 15, 1970, the Department of Defense suspended
military use of Agent Orange upon evidence of the toxicity
of the dioxin component. Subsequently, herbicide spraying

for defoliation using Agent White continued a short while,
and crop destruction using Agents White and Blue continued
through 1970. In January 1971, the last spray mission took
place.

V. Nature of the Complaint & Proceedings Below
Plaintiffs in the instant action include individual Vietnamese
nationals residing in both North and South Vietnam, as well
as the Vietnamese Association for Victims of Agent Orange
(“VAVAO”), a Vietnamese non-profit, non-governmental
organization representing persons who were exposed to
Agent Orange and other herbicides during *113 the war
and whose purpose is to protect the interests of its members
and to raise funds for their care and treatment. Plaintiffs
brought this action on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated who sustained injuries as a result of their
exposure to dioxin. As the District Court enumerated in
extensive detail below, Plaintiffs' alleged injuries included,
among other things, miscarriages, birth defects, breast cancer,
ovarian tumors, lung cancer, Hodgkins' Disease, and prostate
tumors.
Plaintiffs alleged in their September 14, 2004 Amended
Complaint that the United States military's use of Agent
Orange violated international, domestic, and Vietnamese
law and that Defendants either aided and abetted these
violations or committed independent violations by fulfilling
the military's demand for herbicides. With respect to their
claims arising under international law, Plaintiffs alleged that
Defendants' actions constituted torts that were cognizable
under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), 2 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and
included war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and
torture. With respect to their claims arising under domestic
and Vietnamese tort law, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants
were liable for assault and battery, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress,
negligence, wrongful death, and unjust enrichment under
the laws of the United States, Vietnam, and the State
of New York, and for strict product liability under the
laws of the United States and the State of New York.
Plaintiffs also sought equitable relief under theories of public
nuisance and unjust enrichment. In their prayer for relief,
Plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages as
well as injunctive relief directing Defendants to provide
environmental remediation of the allegedly contaminated
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areas in Vietnam and to disgorge profits gained from their
production and supply of herbicide.
2

While our Court has over time referred variously to
28 U.S.C. § 1350 as the Alien Tort Statute, see, e.g.,
Filartiga v. Pena–Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir.1980),
the Alien Tort Act, see, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d
232 (2d Cir.1995) and the Alien Tort Claims Act, see,
e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254,
258 (2d Cir.2007), because the Supreme Court has opted
in Sosa to refer to § 1350 as the Alien Tort Statute, we
think it is preferable to follow that designation.

On November 2, 2004, Defendants filed several dispositive
motions. They first moved under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the Complaint for
failure to state a claim under the ATS. They further moved
under Rule 56 for partial summary judgment dismissing
all claims as time-barred. With respect to several threshold
issues that applied to all international and domestic law
claims, Defendants argued that Plaintiffs lacked standing to
bring this action and that Plaintiffs had raised claims that
were nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine,
were time-barred, and were precluded by the governmentcontractor defense. On the merits, Defendants contended that
Plaintiffs failed to allege a violation of international law under
the ATS that would meet the standard set forth in Sosa v.
Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 159 L.Ed.2d
718 (2004). Defendants also asserted that any award of
injunctive relief requiring remediation of the land in Vietnam
would be impracticable. On January 12, 2005, the United
States government filed a Statement of Interest supporting
Defendants' motion to dismiss the claims under the ATS as
nonjusticiable, as barred by the *114 government-contractor
defense, and as insufficient to meet the Sosa standard.
At a hearing before the District Court, the parties agreed that
the court could consider the motion under Rule 12(b)(6) as a
motion for summary judgment against all of the domestic law
claims but not against the international law claims. They also
agreed that the extensive record assembled by both parties
in the related veterans' cases could be relied upon by the
court on the summary judgment motions. On March 10, 2005,
the District Court issued an opinion and order, which was
amended on March 28, 2005. In re Agent Orange Prod.
Liab. Litig., 373 F.Supp.2d 7 (E.D.N.Y.2005). In its order,
the District Court rejected Defendants' contentions and found
in Plaintiffs' favor on a number of issues. Initially, although

the court cited rulings denying associational standing to
pursue damages claims, it held that VAVAO had standing
because it also sought injunctive relief. Id. at 49–50. The
court next rejected Defendants' position that Plaintiffs' claims
were nonjusticiable, id. at 64–78, and it further determined
that Plaintiffs' ATS claims were not subject to any statutes
of limitation, id. at 59–64, or the government-contractor
defense, id. at 85–99. Moreover, the court concluded that
corporations could be liable in a civil action brought under the
ATS for a violation of international law and that a claim for
aiding and abetting liability was cognizable under the statute.
Id. at 52–59.
Nevertheless, the District Court ultimately determined that
none of Plaintiffs' claims could proceed. With respect
to the ATS claims, the court concluded that Plaintiffs
had failed to state a cause of action because neither the
military's use of Agent Orange nor Defendants' agreement
to supply it to the military violated a well-defined and
universally-accepted international norm prohibiting the use
of herbicides in war. See id. at 105–38 The court concluded
that Plaintiffs' domestic and Vietnamese law claims were
barred by the government-contractor defense for the same
reasons as set forth in the companion case brought by the U.S.
veterans, Isaacson v. Dow Chem. Co., 304 F.Supp.2d 404
(E.D.N.Y.2004). See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig.,
373 F.Supp.2d at 15–17. The court also denied Plaintiffs'
claims for injunctive relief, concluding that implementing
such relief would be “wholly impracticable” and “could
compromise Vietnam's sovereignty.” See id. at 45–46. Final
judgment dismissing the Complaint was entered on March 25,
2005, and this timely appeal by Plaintiffs followed.

ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs limit the scope of their appeal to three primary
claims. They first contend that the District Court erred
by dismissing their ATS claims, arguing that Defendants
violated customary international law norms prohibiting the
use of “poisoned weapons” and the infliction of unnecessary
suffering. 3 Plaintiffs further argue that the court erred by
dismissing their state law claims pursuant to the governmentcontractor defense without conducting further discovery with
respect to Agents White and Blue, and incorporate by
reference the same substantive contentions raised in the
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veterans' appeals. Finally, Plaintiffs assert that the court
prematurely dismissed their claims for injunctive relief
without the benefit of adequate discovery.
3

Plaintiffs do not appear to advance on appeal their
international law claims grounded in genocide, crimes
against humanity, and torture. Nor do they appear to
press any tort claims under Vietnamese law.

*115 For their part, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs
failed to state a cognizable claim under the ATS because
the wartime use of herbicides solely for defoliation purposes
did not violate international law and that prudential
considerations counsel against the recognition of Plaintiffs'
claims. Defendants also argue that the ATS claims present
nonjusticiable political questions because those claims
require an inquiry into executive and legislative judgments
relating to the prosecution of a war. In addition, Defendants
assert that there is no basis in international law for either
corporate liability or civil aiding and abetting liability,
and they argue that Plaintiffs' ATS claims are barred by
both the government-contractor defense and the statute of
limitations. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' state law claims
are preempted by the federal foreign affairs power and
the government-contractor defense, and they incorporate by
reference the same contentions raised in the veterans' cases.
Defendants also argue that the District Court properly denied
injunctive relief because it would be impracticable for the
court to supervise remediation of 5.5 million acres of distant
foreign land. Finally, Defendants argue that the District Court
acted within its discretion in denying additional discovery on
Plaintiffs' claims relating to Agent White and Agent Blue,
because these claims fail for the same reasons as the claims
based on Agent Orange and because Plaintiffs had essentially
abandoned these claims in the District Court.

I. Standard of Review
[1] We “review a district court's grant of a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo.” E & L Consulting,
Ltd. v. Doman Indus. Ltd., 472 F.3d 23, 28 (2d Cir.2006).
“For the purposes of such review, this Court must accept as
true all allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Gorman v.
Consol. Edison Corp., 488 F.3d 586, 591–92 (2d Cir.2007)
(quoting Taylor v. Vt. Dep't of Educ., 313 F.3d 768, 776 (2d
Cir.2002)). We also “review de novo [a] district court's grant
of summary judgment, construing the facts in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party.” Gorman, 488 F.3d at 595
(citing Cioffi v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.,
444 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir.2006)). “Summary judgment is
appropriate only where ‘there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Gorman, 488 F.3d at 595
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). Finally, we review denials of
leave to conduct discovery and of injunctive relief for abuse
of discretion, which may consist of a ruling based upon an
erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of
the evidence. See Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 361 F.3d 696,
716 (2d Cir.2004); Paddington Partners v. Bouchard, 34 F.3d
1132, 1137 (2d Cir.1994). See generally Zervos v. Verizon
New York, Inc., 252 F.3d 163, 169–71 & n. 5 (2d Cir.2001)
(explaining that “[a] district court ‘abuses' or ‘exceeds' the
discretion accorded to it when (1) its decision rests on an
error of law (such as application of the wrong legal principle)
or a clearly erroneous factual finding or (2) its decision—
though not necessarily the product of a legal error or a clearly
erroneous factual finding—cannot be located within the range
of permissible decisions”).

II. Plaintiffs' International Law Claims
A. Alien Tort Statute and the Sosa Rule
[2] The ATS provides that “[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of *116 nations
or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350. The
ATS confers federal subject matter jurisdiction when three
independent conditions are satisfied: (1) an alien sues, (2) for
a tort, (3) committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty ratified by the United States. See Filartiga v. Pena–
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887–88 (2d Cir.1980). The Supreme
Court has clarified that the ATS, which originally was enacted
as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, was jurisdictional in
that it “gave the district courts cognizance of certain [then
existing] causes of action.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713–14, 124
S.Ct. 2739 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Court was clear that the ATS did not create a statutory
cause of action, but the Court just as clearly rejected the
notion that “the ATS was stillborn because there could be no
claim for relief without a further statute expressly authorizing
adoption of causes of action.” Id. at 714, 124 S.Ct. 2739.
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[3]
[4] In the broader context, the law of nations has
become synonymous with the term “customary international
law,” which describes the body of rules that nations in the
international community “universally abide by, or accede to,
out of a sense of legal obligation and mutual concern.” Flores
v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 248 (2d Cir.2003). In
ascertaining whether a rule constitutes a norm of customary
international law, courts have traditionally consulted “the
works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the
general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions
recognizing and enforcing that law.” Filartiga, 630 F.2d at
880 (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153,
160–61, 5 L.Ed. 57 (1820)). Sources of international law
generally include:
(a) international conventions, whether general or
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the
contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations;
(d) ... judicial decisions and the teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as
subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law.
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881 n. 8 (citing Statute of the
International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (entered into force
Oct. 24, 1945)); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56,
100–01 (2d Cir.2003) (same; also noting that scholarly
works are not included among the authoritative sources of
customary international law); see also Restatement (Third)
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102
(1987). While not exhaustive, the list of principles that may
be said to have “ripened into universally accepted norms
of international law,” Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243
n. 8 (1995), includes the proscriptions against piracy, slave
trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, and war
crimes, see Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States § 404 (1987). With respect to
other types of violations, because customary international law
“is created by the general customs and practices of nations
and therefore does not stem from any single, definitive,
readily-identifiable source,” we have advised district courts

to exercise “extraordinary care and restraint” in deciding
whether an offense will violate a customary norm. Flores, 414
F.3d at 248.
[5] In Sosa, the Supreme Court further cautioned courts to
be careful in deciding whether an alleged violation of the law
of nations could support an ATS claim. *117 Mindful of
the legislative history, albeit sparse, of the ATS, the Court
limited the types of claims that could be recognized under
the statute to those bearing the same character as the claims
originally contemplated by Congress at the time of drafting—
tort claims alleging violations of the law of nations of the sort
that would have been recognized within the common law at
the time of its enactment. 542 U.S. at 713–14, 124 S.Ct. 2739.
In the Court's view, “the statute was intended as jurisdictional
in the sense of addressing the power of the courts to entertain
cases concerned with a certain subject,” id. at 714, 124 S.Ct.
2739, and “[t]he jurisdictional grant is best read as having
been enacted on the understanding that the common law
would provide a cause of action for the modest number
of international law violations with a potential for personal
liability at the time,” id. at 724, 124 S.Ct. 2739. In particular,
Sosa held that “courts should require any claim based on the
present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with
a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms” that informed the legislation. Id. at 725, 124
S.Ct. 2739. Moreover, these “paradigms” encompassed only
“those torts corresponding to Blackstone's three primary
offenses: violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights
of ambassadors, and piracy.” Id. at 724, 124 S.Ct. 2739.
Although the Court did not circumscribe ATS claims to
include only these offenses, it concluded that any claim must
reflect the same degree of “definite content and acceptance
among civilized nations” as these historical antecedents. Id. at
732, 124 S.Ct. 2739. Whether an alleged norm of international
law can form the basis of an ATS claim will depend upon
whether it is (1) defined with a specificity comparable to
these familiar paradigms; and (2) based upon a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world. Id.
at 725, 738, 124 S.Ct. 2739. 4 We accordingly begin our
evaluation of Plaintiffs' ATS claims by considering whether
they have alleged the violation of an international norm
that is sufficiently clear in nature to support subject matter
jurisdiction under the ATS.
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4

The plaintiff in Sosa was a Mexican national who had
been abducted, held overnight, and transported to the
United States to face prosecution on charges of the
murder and torture of an agent of the federal Drug
Enforcement Administration. 542 U.S. at 697–98, 124
S.Ct. 2739. Defendant Sosa was a Mexican national
who allegedly had participated in the abduction. After
being acquitted on the charges against him, the plaintiff
brought an action under the ATS against Sosa, and
others alleging that his abduction constituted tortious
conduct under the ATS. See id. at 698–99, 124 S.Ct.
2739. On appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether
the law of nations included “a general prohibition of
‘arbitrary’ detention defined as officially sanctioned
action exceeding positive authorization to detain under
the domestic law of some government, regardless of the
circumstances.” Id. at 736, 124 S.Ct. 2739. Applying the
standard set forth in its opinion, the Court considered
several sources of international law and ultimately held
that “a single illegal detention of less than a day, followed
by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and
a prompt arraignment, violates no norm of customary
international law so well defined as to support the
creation of a federal remedy [under § 1350].” Id. at 738,
124 S.Ct. 2739. Noting that the plaintiff's claim advanced
“an aspiration that exceeds any binding customary rule
having the specificity we require,” the Court concluded
that “[c]reating a private cause of action to further that
aspiration would go beyond any residual common law
discretion we think it appropriate to exercise.” Id. at 738,
124 S.Ct. 2739.

B. Plaintiffs' Sources of Customary International Law
In support of their argument that the deployment of
Agent Orange violated customary norms prohibiting use of
“poisoned *118 weapons” and the infliction of unnecessary
suffering, Plaintiffs cite to a number of both domestic
and international law sources. Primarily, they rely upon
the 1907 Hague Regulations, Annex to the 1907 Hague
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 (the
“1907 Hague Regulations”); the 1925 Geneva Protocol; and
the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, The Fourth Geneva
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 (the “Fourth Geneva Convention”), as well
as other sources derived from these documents. The 1907
Hague Regulations, which the United States ratified in 1909,
address the range of military operations executed on land

and set forth the rules for conducting hostilities, including
the permissible and impermissible means and methods of
war, including poisonous weapons and the prohibition of
materials calculated to cause unnecessary suffering. The
1907 Hague Regulations also form the basis of much of the
language in the national military law handbooks of leading
international states, including those of the United States. See
U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL: THE LAW
OF LAND WARFARE (FM–27–10) 1956 (following the
Hague Regulations article by article). By contrast, the Fourth
Geneva Convention, which the United States ratified in 1955,
principally addresses the treatment of noncombatants in the
hands of enemy forces. As such, it is less relevant than the
1907 Hague Regulations. Nevertheless, the parties do not
dispute that these treaties, with the exception of the 1925
Geneva Protocol, were in force with respect to the United
States during the time frame alleged in the Complaint and that
they have achieved the status of customary international law.
[6] The United States did not ratify the 1925 Geneva
Protocol until 1975. Accordingly, the Protocol cannot be said
to have constituted “a treaty of the United States,” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350, during the period relevant to this appeal. Even at
the time of ratification, the United States and other states
reserved the right to respond in kind to a belligerent's first use
of poisonous weapons and further limited the treaty obligation
to apply only against other treaty parties. The Protocol
provides: “[T]he use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous
or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or
devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion
of the civilized world” and “shall be universally accepted
as part of International Law, binding alike the conscience
and the practice of nations.” Given the nature and scope
of the reservations to ratification, however, it would be an
impermissible stretch to find that the 1925 Geneva Protocol
had acquired the status of binding customary international law
during the Vietnam conflict.
In support of their argument that they have stated a claim
cognizable under the ATS for a violation of the proscription
against the use of poisonous weapons, Plaintiffs cite to
the March 1945 letter opinion of Major General Myron C.
Cramer, Judge Advocate General (“Cramer Opinion”), issued
during the Second World War in response to a request from
the Secretary of War. In particular, Plaintiffs point to the
opinion's conclusion that
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the use of chemical agents ... to
destroy cultivations [sic] or retard
their growth, would not violate any
rule of international law prohibiting
poison gas; upon condition, however,
that such chemicals do not produce
poisonous effects upon enemy
personnel, either from direct contact,
or indirectly from ingestion of plants
and vegetables which have been
exposed thereto. [W]hether *119
[such herbicides] are toxic to such a
degree as to poison an individual's
system, is a question of fact which
should be definitely ascertained.
In addition, Plaintiffs cite to the April 5, 1971 letter opinion
of J. Fred Buzhardt (“Buzhardt Opinion”) from the Office of
General Counsel for the Department of Defense, in response
to a request from Senator J.W. Fulbright, Chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. That opinion relates
to the application of Articles 23(a) and (e) of the Hague
Regulations of 1907—which were incorporated into the
Department of the Army Field Manual—to the destruction of
crops through chemical agents during the Vietnam War:
[N]either the Hague Regulations nor
the rules of customary international
law applicable to the conduct of war
and to the weapons of war prohibit
the use of antiplant chemicals for
defoliation or the destruction of crops,
provided that their use against crops
does not cause such crops as food to
be poisoned nor cause human beings
to be poisoned by direct contact, and
such use must not cause unnecessary
destruction of enemy property.
In further support of their claim that the use of herbicides
as “poison” violated international law, Plaintiffs rely on the
opinions of their experts, Professors George P. Fletcher and
Jordan Paust, as well as the works of other international law
scholars, who generally contend that the use of chemical or
biological warfare violates international law.

In support of their claim that Defendants violated the
prohibition against unnecessary suffering, Plaintiffs argue
that the use of any material object that may have collateral
consequences and is not necessary for military purposes is
universally prohibited. In short, they contend that the use
of Agent Orange was disproportionate to military necessity
because it caused unnecessary human suffering. In particular,
Plaintiffs assert that Articles 146 and 147 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention prohibit “extensive destruction and
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly” if committed
against protected persons or property. In addition, they
argue that Article 50 of that Convention lists as a “grave
breach[ ]” the act of “willfully causing great suffering or
serious injury to body or health.” Plaintiffs further contend
that the 1945 Nuremberg Charter and the 1951 Nuremberg
Principles prohibit “war crimes”—namely, violations of the
laws and customs of war, including “murder, ill-treatment or
deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian
population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment
of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages,
plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction
of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by
military necessity.”

C. Whether Plaintiffs' Claims Are Based on a
Universally–Accepted International Norm
1. Application of Sosa to Plaintiffs' International Law
Claims
[7] The sources of international law relied on by Plaintiffs
do not support a universally-accepted norm prohibiting the
wartime use of Agent Orange that is defined with the degree
of specificity required by Sosa. Although the herbicide
campaign may have been controversial, the record before us
supports the conclusion that Agent Orange was used as a
defoliant and not as a poison designed for or targeting human
populations. Inasmuch as Agent Orange was intended for
defoliation and for destruction of crops only, its use *120
did not violate the international norms relied upon here, since
those norms would not necessarily prohibit the deployment
of materials that are only secondarily, and not intentionally,
harmful to humans. In this respect, it is significant that
Plaintiffs nowhere allege that the government intended to
harm human beings through its use of Agent Orange. In
their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs recognize that “[t]he
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stated purpose of the [herbicide] spraying was twofold: (a)
to defoliate forests and mangroves to destroy the vegetative
cover used by the [Democratic Republic of Vietnam]
and [National Liberation Front] troops for concealment,
and (b) to destroy crops to deprive them of food.” In
addition, Plaintiffs acknowledge that the herbicide defoliation
campaign “heavily targeted,” among other things, vegetative
cover adjacent to U.S. military bases and surrounding areas,
making it all the more implausible that the government
intended to use the herbicide as a poisonous weapon during
war.
There is lack of a consensus in the international community
with respect to whether the proscription against poison
would apply to defoliants that had possible unintended
toxic side effects, as opposed to chemicals intended to
kill combatants. The prohibition on the use of “poison or
poisoned weapons” in Article 23(a) of the 1907 Hague
Regulations is certainly categorical, see 36 Stat. 2277, 2301,
but its scope is nevertheless undefined and has remained
so for a century. As the International Court of Justice
(“ICJ”) has acknowledged in an authoritative interpretation of
Article 23(a), that provision nowhere defines the critical term
“poison,” and “different interpretations exist on the issue.”
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion No. 95, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 248, 255 (July 8, 1996)
(“Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion”). Indeed, Plaintiffs'
own expert conceded that “[t]he concept of ‘poison’ is not
defined.” Plaintiffs themselves concede that the authorities
“go[ ] both ways” as to whether the use of herbicides in war,
“particularly to destroy crops not intended for use by enemy
forces, did violate established norms of international law prior
to 1975.”
Plaintiffs ignore language from the Cramer Opinion
that would permit the use of Agent Orange under the
circumstances in which it was in fact used. Notably, that
Opinion recognizes that “[a] distinction exists between the
employment of poisonous and deleterious gases against
enemy human beings, and the use of chemical agents
to destroy property, such as natural vegetation, crop
cultivations, and the like.” Moreover, the Cramer Opinion
concludes that “[t]he proposed target of destruction, enemy
crop cultivations, is a legitimate one, inasmuch as a
belligerent is entitled to deprive the enemy of food and water,
and to destroy his sources of supply whether in depots, in
transit on land, or growing in his fields.” The Buzhardt

Opinion, as it relates to permissible uses of herbicides,
notes that “General Cramer's opinion clearly encompasses the
activities that have taken place in Vietnam and reflects the
same position which we have taken” in evaluating the legality
of the destruction of crops through chemical agents and the
application of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1907 Hague
Convention.
According to the Buzhardt Opinion, the prohibition of
poisonous weapons “does not effect any prohibition on
the use of other weapons and, in particular, it does not
prohibit the use of chemical herbicides for depriving the
enemy of food and water.” That Opinion interprets the
1956 Army Field Manual relied upon by Plaintiffs to permit
“measures being taken ... to destroy, through chemical or
bacterial agents *121 harmless to man, crops intended solely
for consumption by the armed forces (if that fact can be
determined)” but it draws a distinction between herbicides
that are intended to destroy crops belonging to enemy soldiers
and crops belonging to non-combatants. The Opinion further
states as follows: “The thrust of the phrase ‘harmless to
man’ ... draws attention to Article 23(e) of the Hague
Regulations of 1907, wherein combatants are forbidden to
employ weapons ‘calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.’
”
In a further narrowing of the circumstances under which crop
destruction is impermissible, the Buzhardt Opinion states:
Where it cannot be determined
whether crops were intended solely
for consumption by the enemy's
armed forces, crop destruction would
be lawful if a reasonable inquiry
indicated that the intended destruction
is justified by military necessity under
the principles of Hague Regulation
Article 23(g), and that the devastation
occasioned is not disproportionate to
the military advantage gained.
The Opinion concludes that the decision to refrain from
using herbicides is a matter of United States policy and “is
not compelled by the 1907 Hague Regulations, the Geneva
Protocol of 1925 or the rules of customary international law.”
Accordingly, neither the Cramer Opinion nor the Buzhardt
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Opinion recognizes a universally-accepted prohibition on the
use of herbicides.
Plaintiffs' reliance upon the trials at Nuremberg is inapposite
for the same reasons. As the District Court correctly noted,
the individuals who were found guilty in those criminal
proceedings were found to have supplied poisonous Zyklon B
gas in World War II concentration camps when “the accused
knew that the gas was to be used for the purpose of killing
human beings.” In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373
F.Supp.2d at 94. Because Agent Orange was “not used as
[a] means of directly attacking enemy troops,” it was not
prohibited by Article 23(e)'s proscription of the calculated
use of lethal substances against human beings and its use is
distinguishable from the context in which Zyklon B gas was
used in World War II.
Other sources of United States policy lend additional support
to that conclusion. In 1961, the Secretary of State wrote to
President Kennedy to recommend the use of herbicides in
Vietnam because “successful plant-killing ops in [Vietnam],
carefully coordinated with and incidental to larger ops, can
be of substantial assistance in the control and defeat of the
[Vietcong],” and “[t]he use of defoliant does not violate
any rule of international law concerning the conduct of
chemical warfare and is an accepted tactic of war.” In 1969,
the United States objected to a proposed United Nations
resolution that would have “ma[d]e a clear affirmation that
the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol applied to
the use in war of all chemical, bacteriological and biological
agents (including tear gas and other harassing agents) which
presently existed or which might be developed in the future.”
The following year, after the United States ceased its use
of Agent Orange upon a study revealing its deleterious
effects on humans, the Secretary of State wrote a letter to
President Nixon recommending that the President transmit
to the Senate for advice and consent the ratification of the
1925 Geneva Protocol. In his letter, the Secretary stated that
“[i]t is the United States' understanding of the Protocol that
it does not prohibit the use in war of riot-control agents
and chemical herbicides.” When President Ford ratified the
Geneva Protocol in 1975, he clarified that “[a]lthough it
*122 is our position that the [P]rotocol does not cover riot
control agents and chemical herbicides, I have decided that
the United States shall renounce their use in war as a matter
of national policy.” Moreover, in ratifying the 1925 Geneva
Protocol in 1975, the Senate made clear its understanding

that the United States' prior use of herbicides in Vietnam
had not violated that treaty and that the government intended
the Protocol to be only prospective in effect. See Prohibition
of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Hearing on S. Res.
48 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d
Cong. 3 (1974) (statement of Senator Humphrey reassuring
the Executive Branch that Congress's adoption of the 1925
Geneva Protocol “would in no way reflect on our past
practice with regard to chemical agents. The manner in which
herbicides and riot control agents were used in Vietnam
was fully in accordance with the U.S. [sic] prevailing
interpretation of the protocol”). Although Plaintiffs rely on
the 1907 Hague Regulations instead of the 1925 Geneva
Protocol, it is significant that several nations used poisonous
gases during World War I and the contracting parties to the
Geneva Protocol found it necessary to adopt such a resolution
despite the 1907 Hague Regulations that were in effect.
Plaintiffs' claims that the use of Agent Orange violated the
norm of proportionality and caused unnecessary suffering
rely upon international agreements requiring intentionality
that Plaintiffs cannot establish. Article 23(e) prohibits the
use of “arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause
unnecessary suffering.” Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter
proscribes “wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity.” Agreement
for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis Powers, Charter of the Int'l
Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, pt. II, art. 6, 59 stat. 1544,
1574, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (“Nuremburg Charter”). Article 147
of the Fourth Geneva Convention defines “grave breaches” as
“willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health,” as well as “extensive destruction and appropriation
of property, not justified by military necessity and carried
out unlawfully and wantonly.” These norms are all simply
too indefinite to satisfy Sosa's specificity requirement. As
Plaintiffs' expert opined, “norms that depend on modifiers
such as ‘disproportionate’ or ‘unnecessary’ ... invite a caseby-case balancing of competing interests ... [and] black-letter
rules become vague and easily manipulated. They lose the
definite and specific content that Sosa seems to demand
for recovery under the ATS.” Defendants cite to the Final
Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (the “ICTY”) Prosecutor on the NATO bombing
in Kosovo:
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The main problem with the principle
of proportionality is not whether or
not it exists but what it means
and how it is to be applied. It is
relatively simple to state that there
must be an acceptable relation between
the legitimate destructive effect and
undesirable collateral effects.... It is
much easier to formulate the principle
of proportionality in general terms
than it is to apply it to a particular set of
circumstances because the comparison
is often between unlike quantities and
values.
Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established
to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ¶ 48 (June 8, 2000),
reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 1257, 1271 (2000). The principle
of proportionality implicates the element of intent, e.g.,
“calculated to cause unnecessary suffering,” “wanton
destruction,” “willfully causing great suffering,” and “carried
out unlawfully *123 and wantonly.” See 1907 Hague
Regulations, art. 23(e). Because Plaintiffs do not allege, nor
could they on this record prove, the required mens rea, they
fail to make out a cognizable basis for their ATS claim. The
purpose behind spraying Agent Orange was only to destroy
crops and “to [s]ave the lives of Americans and those of our
allies,” and not to injure human populations.
Plaintiffs have, at best, alleged a customary international
norm proscribing the purposeful use of poison as a weapon
against human beings that is inapplicable in this case. We
hold that Plaintiffs' claim that “defendants manufactur[ed]
and suppl[ied] a[n] herbicide laced with poison” and used
as a defoliant fails to satisfy the standard set forth by the
Supreme Court in Sosa for recognition of a tort in violation of
international law and is, therefore, not cognizable under the
ATS. See, e.g., Alvarez–Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d
604, 620 (9th Cir.2003) (dismissing cross-border abduction
claim, holding: “Because a human rights norm recognizing
an individual's right to be free from transborder abductions
has not reached a status of international accord sufficient
to render it ‘obligatory’ or ‘universal,’ it cannot qualify as
an actionable norm under the [ATS]. This is a case where
aspiration has not yet ripened into obligation.”), rev'd sub

nom Sosa, 542 U.S. at 692, 124 S.Ct. 2739; Flores, 343
F.3d at 160 (holding that “the asserted ‘right to life’ and
‘right to health’ are insufficiently definite to constitute rules
of customary international law.... [I]n order to state a claim
under the [ATS], we have required that a plaintiff allege
a violation of a ‘clear and unambiguous' rule of customary
international law”); Beanal v. Freeport–McMoran, 197 F.3d
161, 167 (5th Cir.1999) (stating that customary international
law cannot be established by reference to “abstract rights
and liberties devoid of articulable or discernable standards
and regulations”). Because we cannot find that Plaintiffs
have grounded their claims arising under international law
in a norm that was universally accepted at the time of the
events giving rise to the injuries alleged, the courts are
without jurisdiction under the ATS to consider them. See
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (“[C]ourts should
require any claim based on the present-day law of nations
to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable
to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have
recognized.”).
Defendants have argued that “civil aiding-and-abetting
liability” may not be imposed on corporate entities for
violations of the law of war and that, in any event, prudential
considerations should preclude adjudication of Plaintiffs'
claims. Because Plaintiffs' claims fail to assert a violation of
international law norms that are universally accepted and as
specific as the paradigmatic norms identified in Sosa, thereby
resulting in a failure to establish a cognizable cause of action
that gives rise to jurisdiction under the ATS, we need not
address these secondary arguments. 5
5

After the filing of briefs and oral argument in this appeal,
this Court addressed in a different case whether a district
court had subject matter jurisdiction over ATS claims
alleging that domestic and foreign corporations aided
and abetted the government of apartheid South Africa in
committing various violations of customary international
law. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, 504 F.3d
254, 260 (2d Cir.2007) (per curiam) (holding that “in
this Circuit, a plaintiff may plead a theory of aiding and
abetting liability under the [ATS]”).

III. Plaintiffs' Claims Arising under Domestic Law
[8] Plaintiffs argue that the District Court erred in dismissing
their state law *124 claims based on the government-
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contractor defense without discovery on Agents White and
Blue, and Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the arguments
of appellants United States veterans in the companion case
decided herewith. With regard to discovery, Plaintiffs were
granted access to the discovery conducted in the companion
case brought by the veterans, and the record below shows
that additional discovery was conducted on Agents White and
Blue. Nevertheless, as set forth in the companion case decided
herewith, the government contractor defense operates as a
complete bar to Plaintiffs' state law claims. See In re Agent
Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., Nos. 05–1760–cv et al., ––– F.3d
–––– (2d Cir. Nov. ––––, 2007).

at this stage in the litigation without further evidentiary
developments to guide the District Court in fashioning a
remedy. The facts relied on by the District Court, however,
in denying the requested injunctive relief—notably Vietnam's
sovereignty and the court's lack of jurisdiction over the
relevant territory—are readily apparent, and Plaintiffs offer
no argument as to how further development of the record
might guide the District Court in fashioning a manageable and
enforceable injunctive remedy. In any event, we find no abuse
of discretion in the district court's decision to deny injunctive
relief for substantially the same reasons given by the District
Court.

IV. Plaintiffs' Claims for Injunctive Relief
[9] The District Court found that the extraterritorial
injunction Plaintiffs sought raised concerns over Vietnam's
sovereignty and was rendered “wholly impracticable” by
the difficulties involved in enforcing an order of abatement
and remediation of vast areas of land over which it had
no jurisdiction. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373
F.Supp.2d at 46. Plaintiffs claim that they have adequately
alleged an irreparable injury that no legal remedy can address.
Plaintiffs further claim that any determination regarding
the practicalities of enforcing an injunction is premature

CONCLUSION

End of Document

Because of our disposition on the issues of law in this case,
we need not address any of the parties' other contentions
on appeal. In accordance with the foregoing, we affirm the
judgment of the District Court.

All Citations
517 F.3d 104
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